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Trade and Investment Agreements: Implications
for Health Protection
Desmond MCNEILL*, Pepita BARLOW*, Carolyn Deere BIRKBECK*, Sakiko
FUKUDA-PARR*, Anand GROVER*, Ted SCHRECKER* & David STUCKLER*
Trade and Investment Agreements (TIAs) have been widely criticized for their potentially negative
effects on health. Many governments, particularly from low- and middle-income countries, have voiced
concerns that mega-regional agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, will erode governments’ scope for health protection,
weakening for instance those options that remain permissible under World Trade Organization rules.
Further, these mega-regional agreements will set default standards and rules of the game that even
non-signatories will need to emulate in order to be competitive in the global market.
This article begins by reviewing the changing structure of trade and investment policy, global
production, and the relation between the two. The effects of TIAs on health are then analysed, based on
some of the most relevant evidence. Key power asymmetries within the global trade and investment
architecture are described, and the way they influence how trade rules are made, implemented and
adjudicated. Section 5 examines a particularly striking and topical instance of such power asymmetries,
investor-state dispute settlement provisions in TIAs, and their relevance to health. The article concludes
with recommendations to mitigate the potential negative health externalities of TIAs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Trade and Investment Agreements (TIAs) have been widely criticized for their
potentially negative effects on health.1,2,3 Concern is rising in the wake of the
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1 Kapczynski, A.,TheTrans-Pacific Partnership – Is It Bad for YourHealth? 373NewEng. J.Med. 201–203 (2015).
2 Luo, J. & Kesselheim, AS., The Trans-pacific Partnership Agreement and Implications for Access to Essential
Medicines (JAMA 2015).
3 Weiss M, Middleton J. & Schrecker, T., Warning: TTIP Could Be Hazardous to Your Health, 37 J. Pub.
Health 367–369 (2015).
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, signed in February 2016, and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) now under
negotiation between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU).
These ‘mega-regional’ agreements are the new wave in trade policy, and if they
come into force TPP and TTIP will together affect more than half of world
trade.4,5 Many governments, particularly from low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs), have voiced concerns that these mega-regional agreements go ‘deeper
and beyond existing… contractual obligations and disciplines’ found in other trade
agreements6 and will erode governments’ scope for health protection, weakening
for instance those options that remain permissible under World Trade
Organization (WTO) rules. Further, the reach of the mega-regionals will extend
well beyond their signatory countries by setting default standards and rules of the
game that even non-signatories of these new agreements will need to emulate in
order to be competitive in the global market.7,8,9 The call from health advocates
around the world call for trade and investment rules that better reflect health
priorities is backed by a growing body of new evidence of the ways international
trade and investment impact how people work, what they consume and how
products are made in ways that affect health outcomes.
Themega-regionals come at a timewhen trade disputes increasingly centre on the
role of health protections.10 In 2015 the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Committee received fifty-four specific trade concerns, a record high, and about 1/3rd
of these pertain to public health. The Barriers to Trade committee notes:
Health protection and labelling, particularly for food and drink, are emerging as a dominant
theme in many of the ‘specific trade concerns’ that members raise in the committee. They
highlight the balance governments try to strike between trade and health—reducing obesity,
discouraging unhealthy eating and alcohol abuse, protecting children, for example, by regula-
tion or by helping consumers to be better informed so they can choose for themselves.
4 TPP: 26.3%; TTIP: 43.6% (Source: WTO 2014). ‘WT/TPR/OV/16’, obtained from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators, WTO Statistics and UNSD Comtrade database.
5 Meléndez-Ortiz, R., Mega-regionals: What is Going on?, in Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Game-
Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading System? 13–14. (Global Agenda Council on Trade &
Foreign Direct Investment ed., Geneva: World Economic Forum 2014), http://www10.iadb.org/intal/
intalcdi/PE/2014/14548.pdf.
6 Ibid.
7 Jones, E., Deere Birkbeck, C., & Woods, N., Manoeuvring at the Margins: Constraints Faced by Small
States in International Trade Relations (London: Commonwealth Secretariat 2010).
8 Yu, P. K., TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 Fordham Intl. L.J. 1129–1182 (2014).
9 Jones, E., Which Way Forward for the WTO? The Plurilaterals Debate, Background Note (Oxford: Global
Economic Governance Programme, University of Oxford 2014), http://www.globaleconomicgover
nance.org/sites/geg/files/WTO%20Plurilaterals%20Background%20Note.pdf.
10 WTO, Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment – Annual Report by the
Director-General – WT/TPR/OV/14, 21 Nov. 2011 (2014).
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(While some countries are concerned to implement fiscal and regulatory measures
to protect their health, in some cases it has been speculated they argue on health
grounds illegitimately in order to introduce protections which would favour
domestic industries).
To the extent trade agreements themselves impact on health, they may come
into conflict with other international agreements, most notably the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and other
human rights agreements which provide an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil
individuals’ right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health
(the right to health) and to take no measures that would negatively affect the right
(retrogressive measures). This includes not only access to healthcare but also clean
water, nutritious food, and a safe work environment. Notably, debate surrounding
the intellectual property (IP) provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which may constrain access to
essential medicines in public health emergencies, has spurred the United Nations
Secretary General to establish a High Level Panel to ‘recommend solutions to
remedying the policy incoherence between the justifiable rights of inventors,
international human rights law, trade rules and public health in the context of
health technologies that is impeding access and the right to health for millions.’11
In 2011, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food recom-
mended that ‘Human rights impact assessments of trade and investment agreements
should be prepared prior to the conclusion of the agreements and in time to
influence the outcomes of the negotiations’, with outcomes up to and including
‘amendment’ or ‘termination of the agreement’.12,13
To address these debates it is first important to understand how trade agree-
ments designed to increase trade flows affect public health. It is indisputable that
they impact on health outcomes, but questions remain as to how and to what
degree. In 2001, a widely cited article in the British Medical Journal asserted that
‘globalisation is good for your health, mostly’,14 claiming that increased openness
11 UN SG, Background Paper: Existing and Prior Work, Initiatives and Proposals to Improve Innovation and
Access to Health Technologies (2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/562094dee4b0d00
c1a3ef761/t/56da11782b8dde9c3d5865b4/1457132156145/DRAFT+Background+Paper+on+
Existing+and+prior+work+initiatives+and+propo+++.pdf (see summary review of work to date UN
SG’s High Level Panel on Innovation and Access to Medicines).
12 De Schutter, O., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Addendum: Guiding Principles on
Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements (A/HRC/19/59/Add.5. New
York: United Nations 2011).
13 Ruckert, A., Schramm, A., Labonte, R., Friel. S., Gleeson, D. & Thow, AM., Policy Coherence, Health,
and the Sustainable Development Goals: A Health-Impact Assessment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. (Critical
Public Health published online 27 Apr. 2016), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/
09581596.2016.1178379.
14 Feachem, R. G. A., Globalisation is Good for Your Health, Mostly, 323 Brit. Med. J. 504–506 (2001).
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to trade leads to more rapid economic growth, with associated opportunities to
reduce poverty and invest in health care. This claim has since been challenged,15
on grounds that it may not reduce poverty16 and could increase within-country
inequalities.17,18,19 A 2009 Lancet series of papers on trade and health identified
multiple mechanisms by which trade could harm health, including access to
pharmaceuticals, dietary changes, and tobacco, alcohol, and other substance use,
for both better and worse.20,2122,23 More recently, the Lancet–University of Oslo
Commission on Global Governance for Health identified TIAs as a major source
of global health inequities.24,25 We believe there is a need to promote further
debate on this issue among trade scholars.
In the following sectionwe review the changing structure of trade and investment
policy, global production, and the relation between the two. In section 3 we apply a
simple conceptual framework for analysing the effects of TIAs on health and
summarize some of the most relevant evidence. Section 4 describes key power
asymmetries within the global trade and investment architecture, and the way they
influence how trade rules are made, implemented and adjudicated. Section 5 examines
a particularly striking and topical instance of such power asymmetries, investor-state
dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in TIAs, and their relevance to health. We
conclude with recommendations to mitigate the potential negative health externalities
of TIAs.
15 Kawachi, I. &Wamala, S., Poverty and Inequality in a Globalizing World, inGlobalisation and Health 122–137
(I. Kawachi & S. Wamala, eds, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007).
16 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), The Least Developed Countries
Report 2013: Growth with Employment for Inclusive and Sustainable Development 24–92 (Paris: UNCTAD
Secretariat 2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ldc2013_en.pdf.
17 Birdsall, N., The World Is Not Flat: Inequality and Injustice in Our Global Economy, WIDER Annual
Lecture (Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research 2006), http://www.wider.
unu.edu/publications/annual-lectures/en_GB/AL9/_files/78121127186268214/default/annual-lec
ture-2005.pdf.
18 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), Trade and Development Report
2014: Global Governance and Policy Space for Development (New York and Geneva: United Nations
2014), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2014_en.pdf.
19 Bourguignon, F., The Globalization of Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2015).
20 Callard, C, Chitanondh, H & Weissman, R., Why Trade and Investment Liberalisation May Threaten
Effective Tobacco Control Efforts, 10 Tobacco Control 68–70 (2001).
21 Chanda, R., Trade in Health Services, 80(2) Bull. World Health Org. 158–163 (2002).
22 Rayner, G., Hawkes, C., Lang, T. & Bello, W., Trade Liberalisation and the Diet Transition: A Public
Health Response, 21(1) Health Promotion Intl. 67–74 (2006).
23 Thow, AM. & Hawkes, C., The Implications of Trade Liberalization for Diet and Health: A Case Study from
Central America, 5(5) Global Health (2009).
24 Ottersen, O. P., Dasgupta, J., Blouin, C., Buss, P., Chongsuvivatwong, V., Frenk, J. et al., The Political
Origins of Health Inequity: Prospects for Change, 383 The Lancet 630–667 (2014).
25 The present article is prepared by members of the Independent Panel on Global Governance for
Health, established to follow up the work of the Commission.
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2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Since the establishment of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs in 1948 (later
replaced by the WTO), four major shifts of relevance to health have occurred.
First, trade increasingly covers not only tangible goods but also services,
including finance and information.
Second, trade has come to be dominated by large companies and a complex web
of global value chains. It is estimated that approximately 80% of global trade involves
global value chains that are controlled by transnational companies (TNCs).26 This
change in the geography of global production means that trade and investment (or
contract production) are increasingly substitutes for one another; one way of con-
ceptualizing this change is in terms of a shift from trade in goods to trade in tasks.27
Third, the establishment of the WTO created a powerful, binding dispute
settlement procedure in which sanctions can be imposed against countries that lose
a case and fail to bring their measures into conformity with WTO obligations in a
reasonable period of time. This means that disputes about health may take place
not in domestic courts but in the dispute settlement process.
Fourth, TIAs – which now largely overshadow the deadlocked WTO
negotiating process - now address not only trade but also investment. They thus
intrude significantly on the ‘policy space’ of signatory countries: ‘the freedom,
scope, and mechanisms that governments have to choose, design, and implement
public policies to fulfill their aims’.28
3 HOW TRADE AGREEMENTS IMPACT PUBLIC HEALTH
The effects of trade liberalization on poverty and inequality must be considered
in any analysis of health impacts, as demonstrated by a substantial literature on
social determinants of health.29,30 Trade liberalization creates winners and losers.
The theoretical economic case for liberalization is based on the presumption that
26 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), World Investment Report 2013:
Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development (New York and Geneva: United Nations 2013).
27 Grossman, G. M. & Rossi-Hansberg, E., The Rise of Offshoring: It’s Not Wine for Cloth Anymore, The New
Economic Geography: Effects and Policy Implications 59–102 (Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City 2006), http://www.frbkc.org/Publicat/Sympos/2006/PDF/8GrossmanandRossi-Hansberg.pdf.
28 Koivusalo, M., Schrecker, T., & Labonté, R., Globalization and Policy Space for Health and Social
Determinants of Health, in Globalization and Health: Pathways, Evidence and Policy 105 (R. Labonté,
T. Schrecker, C. Packer, & V. Runnels eds, New York: Routledge 2009).
29 See e.g. Commission on Social Determinants of Health, Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity
Through Action on Social Determinants of Health (Geneva: World Health Organization 2008), http://
whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf.
30 See e.g. Kelly, M. & Doohan, E., The Social Determinants of Health, in Global Health: Diseases, Programs,
Systems and Policies 75–114 (M. Merson, R. Black & A. Mills eds, Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett
2012).
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losers will be compensated through the redistribution of some portion of the
aggregate economic gains from expanded trade, but this may or may not actually
occur. Recent model-based analyses of the anticipated economic effects of the
TTIP and TPP find that both will lead to a declining labour share of national
income and, in some countries, will not promote growth at all.31,32 Trade
agreements – as the prime instrument for trade liberalization – can impact health
also in other ways, for better or worse. Figure 1, based on the analysis of Blouin
et al.,33 provides a heuristic that shows how loss of policy space and loss of
government revenue34 can lead to negative health outcomes. Apart from possible
changes in inequality (just mentioned) our analysis focuses on three main ‘distal
impacts’ – labour conditions, food, and health care. In the following we sum-
marise evidence regarding these three types of health effect, and how TIAs may
exacerbate the situation.
Figure 1 A Generic Framework for Thinking About Trade/Investment Agreements and
Health
31 Capaldo, J., The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: European Disintegration, Unemployment and
Instability (GDAE Working Paper No. 14-03. Medford, MA: Global Development and Environment
Institute, Tufts University 2014), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/14-03CapaldoTTIP.pdf.
32 Capaldo, J., Izurieta, A., & Sundaram, J. K., Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality and Other Risks of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (GDAE Working Paper No. 16-01. Medford, MA: Global
Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University 2016), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/
Pubs/wp/16-01Capaldo-IzurietaTPP.pdf.
33 Blouin, C., Chopra, M., & van der Hoeven, R., Trade and Social Determinants of Health, 373 The
Lancet 502–507 (2009).
34 Lost revenue can also be considered a constraint on policy space, by limiting scope and capacity for
implementation.
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Food: a number of case studies in Central America, Asia and the Pacific identify
increased penetration of low- and middle-income country (LMIC) markets by
supermarkets, fast food restaurants, and the manufacturers and distributors of
processed foods after entering into TIAs that reduced barriers to imports and
investment.35 For example, the removal of trade and investment barriers between
the US and Mexico was followed by increasing US exports and Mexican con-
sumption of processed meats, and declining consumption of grains and
pulses.36,37
A number of studies have attempted to better establish causality based on
more rigorous econometric analysis. One cross-sectional analysis of fifty low- and
middle- income countries found that countries with trade agreements with the
US have 50% higher levels of soft-drink consumption per capita than those that
do not; higher foreign investment as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) was also associated with increased levels of processed meat and alcohol
consumption.38 In addition, a natural experiment in Vietnam identified that
annual growth in soft-drink sales per capita increased by 8.8 % after joining the
WTO, which was unmatched with the control country the Philippines.39 One
study combining individual-level data and an index of globalization found that
increased economic globalization was also associated with higher body-mass
index among women in fifty-six LMICs, although stronger associations were
observed with political and social dimensions of the globalization index.40 Given
a strong-reliance on time-series analyses the evidence of a causal effect of TIAs
on consumption of unhealthy processed foods and beverages and health precludes
definitive conclusions41; yet, the consistency in these findings suggest that TIAs
35 Friel, S., Hattersley, L., & Townsend, R., Trade Policy and Public Health 36 Annual Rev. Pub. Health
325–344 (2015).
36 Clark, S. E., Hawkes, C., Murphy, S. M. E., Hansen-Kuhn, K. A., & Wallinga, D., Exporting Obesity:
US Farm and Trade Policy and the Transformation of the Mexican Consumer Food Environment 18 Intl. J.
Occupational & Envtl. Health 53–64 (2012).
37 Goran, M. I., Ulijaszek, S. J., & Ventura, E. E., High Fructose Corn Syrup and Diabetes Prevalence: A
Global Perspective, 8 Global Pub. Health 55–64 (2013).
38 Stuckler, D., McKee, M., Ebrahim, S., & Basu, S., Manufacturing Epidemics: The Role of Global Producers
in Increased Consumption of Unhealthy Commodities Including Processed Foods, Alcohol, and Tobacco, 9 PLoS
Med e1001235 (2012).
39 Schram, A., Labonte, R., Baker, P., Friel, S., Reeves, A., & Stuckler, D., The Role of Trade and
Investment Liberalization in the Sugar-Sweetened Carbonated Beverages Market: A Natural Experiment
Contrasting Vietnam and the Philippines, 11(1) Global. Health (2015).
40 Goryakin, Y., Lobstein, T., James, W. P. T., & Suhrcke, M., The Impact of Economic, Political and Social
Globalization on Overweight and Obesity in the 56 Low and Middle Income Countries, 133 Soc. Sci. & Med.
67–76 (2015).
41 Barlow, P., & Stuckler, D., How Do Trade Agreements Affect Public Health? A Systematic Literature Review
and Network Co-citation Analysis (manuscript under review)
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could lead to accelerated nutrition transitions toward unhealthy foods and an
accompanying rise of overweight and obesity.42,43,44,45,46
The provisions within TIAs may also limit the ability of countries to warn of
health hazards associated with alcohol, tobacco and unhealthy processed foods, and
that are effective in discouraging consumption.47 Issues related to tobacco are
discussed elsewhere in the paper, but a particularly relevant concern is that ‘a
legal clause in a trade agreement can limit the power of a state to protect the public
from a product that kills if used in the manner for which it is produced’ which is
considered a ‘weakness of the system’s protective architecture’.48 For example,
Thailand’s restrictions on alcohol labelling have been challenged by several coun-
tries under the TBT Agreement.49 Legal clauses limiting such regulations may not
only restrict the ability to implement a set of policies, but may also precipitate
‘regulatory chill’ whereby governments retract, alter or reconsider regulations that
favour health due to fears that these may fall foul of trade agreements; that trade
sanctions may be imposed by trading partners; or that decisions taken by relevant
dispute settlement bodies will force governments to retract particular health poli-
cies and laws or pay compensation. TIAs can therefore potentially increase access
to tobacco and processed food as outlined above, whilst simultaneously forsaking
opportunities to regulate in ways that could mitigate these impacts.
In a long-running dispute between the US and the EU, the US has levied levy
duties on imports from the EU in response to the latter’s prohibition on the sale of
meat from cattle treated with human growth hormone.50 In the EU, the precau-
tionary principle is entrenched in a number of laws, covering ‘those specific
circumstances where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain
42 Popkin, B. M., Global Context of Obesity, in Handbook of Obesity Prevention 227–238 (S. Kumanyika &
R.C. Brownson eds, New York: Springer US 2007), http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-47860-
9_11.
43 Popkin, B. M., Adair, L. S., & Ng, S. W., Global Nutrition Transition and the Pandemic of Obesity in
Developing Countries, 70 Nutrition Rev. 3–21 (2012).
44 Hawkes, C., Friel, S., Lobstein, T., & Lang, T., Linking Agricultural Policies with Obesity and
Noncommunicable Diseases: A New Perspective for a Globalising World, 37 Food Policy 343–353 (2012).
45 Monteiro, C. A., Moubarac, J. C., Cannon, G., Ng, S. W., & Popkin, B., Ultra-Processed Products are
Becoming Dominant in the Global Food System, 14 Obesity Rev. 21–28 (2013).
46 Popkin, B. M., Nutrition, Agriculture and the Global Food System in Low and Middle Income Countries, 47
Food Policy 91–96 (2014).
47 Friel, S., Gleeson, D., Thow, A-M., Labonte, R., Stuckler, D., Kay, A., & Snowdon, W., A New
Generation of Trade Policy: Potential Risks to Diet-Related Health from the Trans Pacific Partnership
Agreement, 9 Global. Health 46 (2013), https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/
10.1186/1744-8603-9-46.
48 Friel, S., Hattersley, L., & Townsend, R., Trade Policy and Public Health, 36 Annual Rev. Pub. Health
325–344, 331 (2015).
49 Ibid., at 331–332.
50 Johnson, R., The US-EU Beef Hormone Dispute No. R40449 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40449.pdf.
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and there are indications through preliminary objective scientific evaluation that
there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on
the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the
chosen level of protection’.51 There is little doubt that the precautionary principle
is often invoked in ways that aim to boost or protect opportunities for local
producers and thereby discriminate against foreign producers. However, there
are cases where the core motivation is indeed to protect and environmental or
health objectives. It is significant that the European Commission (EC), in nego-
tiating TTIP on behalf of EU member countries, is promoting ‘SPS-plus’ provi-
sions that go far beyond those in the WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards (SPS).52,53
Employment: Unemployment can negatively impact psychological and somatic
health (Bartley, 1994; Paul and Moser, 2009), and changes in the types of skills that
are demanded as a consequence of TIAs may induce short-term unemployment
whilst workers find new jobs.54 This can also translate into long-term unemploy-
ment if workers are unable to retrain, or migrate in order to find new jobs,
suggesting a potentially critical role for labour market policy.55,56 Although the
causal linkages are complex, trade liberalization is also associated with increased
segmentation of labour markets and the rise of precarious employment,57 which
has been identified as an important negative influence on health.58 When TIAs are
ratified between high-income countries with scarce unskilled labour and LMICs
abundant in labour, it may be that TIAs negatively impact on health by increasing
employment in labour-intensive industries with poor working conditions. Yet, the
outcome is not clear-cut when considering the possible counterfactual: as unpala-
table as the situation may be, even low-wage, arduous jobs such as those in Export
51 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary
Principle (COM(2000)1. Brussels: European Commission 2000), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_con
sumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf.
52 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm.
53 European Commission, Trade Cross-cutting Disciplines and Institutional Provisions: Initial EU Position Paper
(Brussels: European Commission 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_
151622.pdf.
54 Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H., The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to
Large Changes in Trade, 8(1) Annual Rev. Econ. (2016).
55 Krugman, P. R., Obstfeld, M., & Melitz, M., International Trade: Theory and Policy (Prentice Hall
2015).
56 Barlow & Stuckler, supra n. 41.
57 Schrecker, T., Labor Markets, Equity, and Social Determinants of Health, in Globalization and Health:
Pathways, Evidence and Policy 81–104) (R. Labonté, T. Schrecker, C. Packer, & V. Runnels eds, New
York: Routledge 2009).
58 Benach, J., Vives, A., Amable, M., Vanroelen, C., Tarafa, G., & Muntaner, C., Precarious Employment:
Understanding an Emerging Social Determinant of Health, 35 Annual Rev. Pub. Health 229–253 (2014).
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Processing Zone garment factories may represent an improvement on the life
chances that would otherwise be unavailable.59
TIAs can affect labour regulations by changing the political and economic
contexts that influence policy space. Cross-national comparisons draw unclear
conclusions on the effects of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) on labour
standards, with some studies identifying a positive correlation between the adop-
tion of core labour standard and increased trade, but not FDI.60,61,62 Others
identify a positive correlation running in the opposite direction whereby reducing
labour regulations increases FDI but not vice versa.63 Formal recognition of the
right to free association and collective bargaining (for example) is not necessarily
reflected in conditions ‘on the ground’, so these findings should be treated with
caution. Furthermore, these studies do not capture potential ‘regulatory chill’
effects. In summary, TIAs may lead to the changes to labour standards we have
outlined above, whilst also limiting opportunities for mitigating their health effects.
Health services the provisions within the agreements that affect access to
medicines are a good illustration of the way TIAs affect health by limiting policy
space. IP rights relating to medicines that were established by TRIPS (1994), and
moderated by the Doha declaration (2001), are now again strengthened through
‘TRIPS plus’, which is included in TIAs such as the TPP. As an example of how
patents can affect prices, HIV AIDS retrovirals were sold at about USD 15,000
under patent in 2001. Cipla offered them for USD 350 at that time. Now they are
manufactured by generics companies for USD 65.64 By virtue of TRIPS ‘flexibil-
ities’, countries are permitted to use compulsory licences to make patented drugs
more affordable under certain circumstances.65 There is some evidence that grant-
ing compulsory licenses (CL) can increase access to pharmaceuticals. For example,
between 2006 and 2008 Thailand granted import licenses for generic equivalents of
seven patented drugs used in treating cancer and heart disease. Although it is
59 Kabeer, N. & Mahmud, S., Rags, Riches and Women Workers: Export-oriented Garment Manufacturing in
Bangladesh, inChains of Fortune: LinkingWomen Producers andWorkers with Global Markets 133–164 (M. Carr
ed., London: Commonwealth Secretariat 2004), http://wiego.org/sites/wiego.org/files/publications/
files/Kabeer-Mahmud-Export-Oriented-Garment-Bangladesh.pdf.
60 Neumayer, E. & De Soysa, I., Trade Openness, Foreign Direct Investment and Child Labor, 33 World Dev.
43–63 (2005).
61 Neumayer, E. & De Soysa, I., Globalization and the Right to Free Association and Collective Bargaining: An
Empirical Analysis, 34 World Dev. 31–49 (2006).
62 Neumayer, E. & De Soysa, I., Globalisation, Women’s Economic Rights and Forced Labour, 30 World
Economy 1510–1535 (2007).
63 Olney, W. W., A Race to the Bottom? Employment Protection and Foreign Direct Investment, 91(2) J. Intl.
Econ. 191–203 (2013).
64 McNeil, Donald G., Indian Company Offers to Supply AIDS Drugs at Low Cost in Africa, N.Y. Times (7
Feb. 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/07/world/indian-company-offers-to-supply-aids-
drugs-at-low-cost-in-africa.html.
65 ‘t Hoen, E., Berger, J., Calmy, A., & Moon, S., Driving a Decade of Change: HIV/AIDS, Patents and
Access to Medicines for All, 14 J. Intl. AIDS Socy. 15 (2011).
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difficult to estimate the number of lives saved as a consequences of granting
licenses, an extrapolation of trends before the licenses were granted compared
with actual access rates suggests that an additional 84,158 patients received access to
the drugs and 12,493 QALYs were gained due to the reforms.66 But In practice,
the Thai case is exceptional: only a limited number of CLs have been issued. A
decade after the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and public health affirmed
these flexibilities there were ‘few instances’ of CLs for diseases other than AIDS,
and none ‘for high-impact diseases with patented treatments such as malaria, multi-
drug resistant tuberculosis, or sepsis’.67 This may be because as of April 2015, 5% of
the drugs on WHO’s essential medicines list were under patent protection,
although this is likely to change in future.68 Governments are also presented
with the potential challenge of choosing between seeking to use TRIPS flexibil-
ities and gaining access to trading partners’ markets. Meanwhile, the US in
particular has attempted to negotiate higher levels of IP protection – ‘TRIPS-
plus’ provisions – in bilateral and regional TIAs, which provide an additional
barrier to affordable access. The Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR), for example, restricted Guatemalan market access of some generic
drugs that are available in the US.69,70,71 ‘TRIPS-plus’ provisions are also being
promoted by the EC and the US in TTIP.72
Many TIAs have provisions or chapters on services. For the health commu-
nity, particular concerns have arisen about ‘mode 3’ trade in services (which relates
to ‘commercial presence’, e.g. of foreign investors in private healthcare facilities or
health insurance) and from ISDS provisions, discussed in greater detail in section 5,
that might entitle investors to seek compensation in the event that health services
(or health insurance) currently in the private sector were taken into the public
sector. For example, in the context of the UK’s National Health Service (NHS),
one analysis expressed concern that expanded involvement of private contractors
66 Yamabhai, I., Mohara, A., Tantivess, S., Chaisiri, K., & Teerawattananon, Y., Government Use Licenses
in Thailand: An Assessment of the Health and Economic Impacts, 7(1) Global. & Health 1 (2011).
67 Beall, R. & Kuhn, R., Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A
Database Analysis, 9 PLoS Med e1001154 (2012).
68 Saez, C., WHO Reviews Its Essential Medicines List; Some New Candidates Under Patent. Intellectual
Property Watch [On-line] (2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/04/21/who-reviews-its-essential-
medicines-list-some-new-candidates-under-patent/
69 Roffe, P., Von Braun, J., & Vivas-Eugui, D., A New Generation of Regional and Bilateral Trade
Agreements: Lessons from the US-CAFTA-DR Agreement, in Trade and Health: Seeking Common Ground
41–89 (C. Blouin, N. Drager, & J. Heymann eds, Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2008).
70 Shaffer, E. R. & Brenner, J. E., A Trade Agreement’s Impact on Access to Generic Drugs, 28 Health Affairs
w957–w968 (2009).
71 Correa, C. M., High Costs, Negligible Benefits from Intellectual Property Provisions in FTAs, 44 IIC – Intl.
Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 902–905, 903–904 (2013).
72 Bloemen, S. & Mellema, T., Trading Away Access to Medicines – Revisited, Joint Agency Briefing Paper
(Oxford: HAI Europe and Oxfam International 2014), http://bit.ly/1x5hJTk.
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might become ‘locked in’ due to the possibility of compensation claims by
investors if alternatives are sought.73,74 In the ongoing Trade in Services (TiSA)
negotiations, there are efforts to negotiate provisions that would limit the scope for
signatories to pull back from current and future liberalization, and to omit some of
the safeguards in the WTO’s existing General Agreement on Services (GATS) that
permit countries to step back from a given commercial relation, such as by
revoking a privatization of a previously publicly funded service. These matters
are a concern for health due to the possible opportunity costs of compensation
payments, and because privatization may not necessarily translate into higher
quality and more equitable health-service provision.75
In summary, TIAs can have a significant – and potentially negative – impact
on health. To better understand the political economy of the processes involved, it
is necessary to consider how the content and scope of TIAs are determined,
including the interests they represent. There are concerns, for example, that the
existing trade policy architecture incorporates a ‘mobilization of bias’ in favour of
commercial goals and against health-protective regulations which infringe upon
these aims. We discuss this concept and its implications in the section that follows.
4 KEY POWER ASYMMETRIES: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHY
THEY MATTER
Political scientists continue to debate the nature and sources of power. However,
there is widespread agreement that:
– Power can operate through control of resources (e.g. investment
capital or funds needed to finance political activity);
– Power can operate through the design of institutions that favour
certain interests or claims relative to others – what has been called
the mobilization of bias;
– Power involves not only visible interactions in which one party
prevails over another (e.g. elections, court cases) but also situations
in which its operation is invisible (e.g. keeping some issues off the
73 Weiss, M., Trading Health? UK Faculty of Public Health Policy Report on the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership 94 (London: UK Faculty of Public Health 2015), http://www.fph.org.uk/
uploads/FPH%20Policy%20report%20on%20the%20Transatlantic%20Trade%20and%20Investment%
20Report%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
74 See also Reynolds, L. & McKee, M., Is the NHS Really Safe from International Trade Agreements?, Brit.
Med. J. (2015), doi:10.1136/bmj.h2179.
75 lbreht, T., Privatization Processes in Health Care in Europe – A Move in the Right Direction, a
‘Trendy’option, or a Step Back?, 19(5) Eur. J. Pub. Health 448–450 (2009).
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policy agenda, perhaps because of anticipated reactions) – what
have been called the two faces of power.76,77
Trade and investment relations among countries are asymmetrical; and all three
of these forms of power are manifested in the negotiations concerning TIAs.
Countries vary enormously in terms of the size of their markets, and countries
with small populations and relatively low GDP may have to grant major con-
cessions to larger, richer trading partners in order to secure even modest
improvements in market access.78,79 This may explain, for example, situations
in which LMICs agree to provisions such as TRIPs-plus measures in bilateral and
regional agreements that are likely to increase health inequalities. This point
assumes added importance in today’s trade policy context, where action has
shifted to plurilateral and regional negotiations and away from the WTO,
where agreements generally require consensus among all Members and where
the prospects for collective action by smaller countries to build negotiating
power and defend their interests are higher. Another important asymmetry
relates to the capacity of countries to assess the full implications of entering
into TIAs. Here again, the devil is in the details, and the knowledge and expertise
required to master this very complex field – and to negotiate effectively – is
limited in many LMICs,80 and indeed in national health departments or minis-
tries in some high-income countries as well. Within government, it has been
claimed that ‘most health ministers lack domestic political muscle. They might
talk tough among themselves, but back home they have to get in line behind
colleagues in finance, defence, trade, and even education’.81 To the extent that
this is the case, it may reflect power inequalities or asymmetries that exist not
only across national borders, but also within them. It has often been observed
that business occupies a generically privileged position in market economies
because of its control over investment.82 In addition, the simple quantum of
resources available to large corporations often gives them a disproportionate
ability to influence public policy, to the point where (for example) it has been
76 Lukes, S., Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan 1974).
77 Smith, R. D., The Role of Economic Power in Influencing the Development of Global Health Governance, 3
Global Health Governance (2010).
78 Stiglitz, J. & Charlton, A., Common Values for the Development Round, 3 World Trade Rev. 495–506
(2004).
79 Shadlen, K. C., Exchanging Development for Market Access? Deep Integration and Industrial Policy Under
Multilateral and Regional-Bilateral Trade Agreements, 12 Rev. Intl. Political Economy 750–775 (2005).
80 Jones et al., supra n. 7.
81 The Lancet, What Can the UN General Assembly Do for Global Health?, 382 The Lancet 1000 (2013).
82 Lindblom, C., Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic Systems 170–221 (New York: Basic
Books 1977).
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observed with respect to the US position in the negotiations that led to TRIPs
that ‘in effect, twelve corporations [in the information and pharmaceutical
industries] made public law for the world’.83 In a world of globally organised
production and footloose capital, the power of TNCs is of special significance,
not least because the best prospects for LMIC economic development often
involve integration into global value chains (controlled by TNCs) with the
hope of moving up those chains to higher-value production, despite risks such
as exposure to hazardous working conditions and precarious employment rela-
tions as the price of engagement.84 Faced with the bargaining power of TNCs,
governments wishing to attract and retain foreign investment must contemplate a
variety of compromises on issues ranging from labour standards to health protec-
tions. TNCs can also replace direct investment with outsourced contract produc-
tion, which reduces their financial risk and enable them to limit costs by playing
suppliers off one against another. The power that is exercised by strong nations
and large corporations has a clear influence on how global rules are made,
implemented and adjudicated.
Making the rules: In addition to, and because of, their financial resources and
strategic advantages, corporate trade lobbyists have much better access to decision-
makers than public health and civil society actors, at both national and interna-
tional levels. As an example, during TPP negotiations in the US, private industry
and trade groups represented the lion’s share of committee members – 85% of the
total.85,86,87 Until the agreed text was published, members of the US Congress, and
citizens, were denied access except through leaks and rumours. Yu88 suggests that
the absence of civil society from the negotiations was part of a much broader
phenomenon of exclusion. Similarly, in the EU, the EC, the Union’s executive
branch, consults regularly with representatives of major European-based industry
groups,89through both formal and informal channels. The EC’s fourteen-member
Advisory Group of experts established to advise negotiators on the TTIP talks
83 Sell, S. K., Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2003).
84 Abdulsamad, A., Frederick, S., Guinn, A., & Gereffi, G., Pro-Poor Development and Power Asymmetries in
Global Value Chains (Durham: Center on Globalization, Governance & Competitiveness, Duke
Univer s i ty 2015) , h t tp ://www.cggc .duke.edu/pdf s/Pro-PoorDeve lopment_and_
PowerAsymmetries_inGlobalValueChains_Final.pdf.
85 Fidler DP, Drager N, Lee K., Managing the Pursuit of Health and Wealth: The Key Challenges, 373 The
Lancet 325–331 (2009).
86 Lee K, Sridhar D, Patel M., Bridging the Divide: Global Governance of Trade and Health, 373 The Lancet
416–422 (2009).
87 Smith RD, Correa C, Oh C., Trade, TRIPS, and Pharmaceuticals, 373 The Lancet 684–691 (2009).
88 Yu, supra n. 8.
89 Young AR, & John Peterson, The EU and the New Trade Politics, 13 J. Eur. Pub. Policy 795–814
(2006).
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includes only one representative from a public health organization, but at least
seven from various business sectors.90 Major tobacco firms and pharmaceutical
companies have often met privately and directly with EC officials during TTIP
negotiations.91 Although the EC is also required to consult and seek input from
civil society groups and the European Parliament’s Committee on International
Trade, these do not provide health advocates with comparable scope for obtaining
information and making direct input on negotiations as they unfold. In an instance
of regulatory chill, it was revealed in May 2015 that as part of the TTIP process US
trade negotiators successfully pressured the EU to withdraw proposed regulations
on thirty-one pesticides suspected of damaging endocrine functioning.92 Similarly,
lobbying by the services industry spurred some governments to pursue plurilateral
negotiations for an agreement on Trade in Services outside the WTO, thus
removing even the limited transparency and opportunities for direct public health
input available through negotiations hosted at the WTO.93
Implementing the rules: Once TIAs are signed and ratified, countries - particu-
larly LMICs – face a web of diplomatic and economic pressures to speed their
implementation and to adopt measures that go even beyond the terms of those
agreements.94 In the latest round of US TIAs with LMICs, the US ratifies the
agreement only after the US government agrees that the country has already
implemented the agreement satisfactorily – underscoring the intrinsic asymmetries
referred to above.95 And through monitoring measures such as the annual ‘Special
301’ Watch Lists, the US identifies countries that it considers not sufficiently
compliant with US preferences on IP protection and enforcement in a diplomatic
warning process mandated by legislation but drawing directly on industry
90 European Commission, Expert Group to Advise European Commission on EU-US Trade Talks. European
Commission [On-line] (2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-79_en.htm.
91 Gallagher, P., TTIP Controversy: The European Commission and Big Tobacco Accused of Cover-up After
Heavily Redacted Documents Released. Independent (27 Aug. 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/home-news/ttip-controversy-the-european-commission-and-big-tobacco-accused-of-cov
erup-after-heavily-redacted-documents-released-10473601.html.
92 Neslen, A., EU Dropped Pesticide Laws Due to US Pressure Over TTIP, Documents Reveal. Guardian (22
May 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/22/eu-dropped-pesticide-laws-
due-to-us-pressure-over-ttip-documents-reveal.
93 Marchetti, J. A. & Roy, M., The Tisa Initiative: An Overview of Market Access Issues, 38 J. World Trade
683–728 (2014).
94 Deere, C., The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property
Reform in Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008).
95 Abbott, F. M., Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements in Light of U.S
Federal Law, UNCTAD – ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development Issue Paper No. 12
(Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1912621.
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submissions.96 The US has used threats of trade sanctions and a suite of diplomatic
pressures as well as technical assistance and training initiatives to dissuade countries
from tailoring IP legislation to support public health objectives where the US has
considered this contrary to the interests of its industries.97,98,99
Through diplomatic and economic pressures such as these, the US has also
forced some countries to abandon the pursuit of CL to achieve greater access to
essential medicines.100,101At the same time, governments face numerous pressures
through international trade negotiations to boost IP enforcement, ostensibly to
reduce trade in counterfeit goods but which may also sometimes serve to limit the
availability of legal, safe, generic medicines.102 Many LMIC governments face a
range of such pressures and find it difficult to navigate several different interna-
tional processes simultaneously, particularly when corporate lobbyists are able to
bypass foreign affairs officials and go directly to national agencies and legislatures to
get laws passed.103 In a recent example, the East African Economic Community
adopted, as part of its regional cooperative arrangements, stronger provisions on IP
enforcement than required by TRIPS and other measures to limit counterfeit
medicines - due to direct lobbying by industry groups of national legislators of
Member countries.104
Adjudicating the rules: Perhaps the most important mobilization of bias
related to TIAs is that governments (and in the case of ISDS provisions foreign
investors) have standing to claim that their interests have been undermined by
trade and investment policy decisions. Parties wishing to argue that their health
has been adversely affected by the operation of TIAs have no comparable
opportunities at the international level, although they may in some cases have
standing in domestic legal fora. Recent disputes at the WTO have exacerbated
96 Sell, S. K., Industry Strategies for Intellectual Property and Trade: The Quest For TRIPS, and Post-TRIPS
Strategies, Cardozo J. Intl. Comp. L. 79–108 (2002).
97 Deere, C., The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property
Reform in Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008).
98 Morin, J.-F., Daley, K., & Gold, E. R., Having Faith in IP: Empirical Evidence of IP Conversions, 3
WIPO J. 93–102 (2011).
99 Flynn, S., US Uses Special 301 To Bully Ukraine, Likely Violating WTO. Techdirt [On-line] (2013),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130513/16505323067/us-uses-special-301-to-bully-ukraine-
likely-violating-wto.shtml.
100 Deere, supra n. 97.
101 Smith, R. D., Correa, C., & Oh, C., Trade, TRIPS, and Pharmaceuticals, 373 The Lancet 684–691
(2009).
102 The ACTA and the Plurilateral Enforcement Agenda: Genesis and Aftermath (Roffe, P. & Seuba, X. eds,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015).
103 Panke, D., Small States in Multilateral Negotiations. What Have We Learned? 25 Cambridge Rev. Intl.
Affairs 387–398 (2012).
104 Spennemann, C., ACTA, East African Enforcement Legislation and Generic Medicines – A Comparison, in
The ACTA and the Plurilateral Enforcement Agenda: Genesis and Aftermath, 244–259 (P. Roffe &
X. Seuba eds, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014).
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concerns that trade rules can be used in ways that undermine public health,
such as by challenging tobacco control measures like graphic health warnings,
and the plain packaging of tobacco products, which are being implemented in
Australia, Ireland and New Zealand. Whereas industry groups regularly prove
successful in prompting, and in some cases financing, legal challenges at the
WTO, public health advocates generally lack either the equivalent influence on
trade officials or the resources to help governments finance expensive
litigation.105
Several WTO agreements include a general exception for measures
‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’. In principle,
the WTO’s core agreements on both goods and services, for instance, provide
that countries can use such exceptions to defend measures that may constitute
a barrier to trade.106 In the early years of WTO jurisprudence, states wishing
to defend measures on the ground that they are necessary to protect health
had to meet a high and unpredictable standard of proof,107 and circa 2010, in
forty cases before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body where the State raised
this defence, in only one dispute did the arbitrators side with the State.108
This dispute (Dispute 135: EC-Asbestos) involved the most widely recognised
environmental and workplace carcinogen - asbestos. The most common
reason for rejecting the validity of the health exception as invoked by the
defending State was that it could not show the measure was sufficiently
‘necessary’ to protect life or health – a determination that raises the issues
of competing values guiding the choice of a standard of proof, and of the
willingness and ability of trade adjudicators to address these. For WTO
panelists, even if the importance of the health issue at hand is recognized,
their task is to determine whether the measure is undertaken in ways that
respect key WTO principles, such as non-discrimination, and whether alter-
native options exist that would achieve the desired public policy goal with less
detriment to trade. A review of proceedings to date, however, reveals that an
105 Eckhardt, J. & De Bièvre, D., Boomerangs over Lac Léman: Transnational Lobbying and Foreign Venue
Shopping in WTO Dispute Settlement, 14 World Trade Rev. 507–530 (2015).
106 Drager, N., Beaglehole, R., Lipson, D., Mirza, Z., Rodríguez Mendoza, M., Wijkstrom, E. et al.,
WTO Agreements & Public Health: A joint study by the WHO and the WTO Secretariat 30–31 (Geneva:
World Health Organization and World Trade Organization 2002), https://www.wto.org/english/
res_e/booksp_e/who_wto_e.pdf.
107 Howse, J. & Caldwell, M. C., The State of Infant Health: Is There Trouble Ahead?, in America’s Health:
State Health Rankings (United Health Foundation ed., Seattle, WA: United Health Foundation
2004).
108 McGrady, B., Trade and Public Health: The WTO, Tobacco, Alcohol, and Diet 130–169 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2011).
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implicit presumption against the validity of health-related defences, and
against a precautionary approach, appears to be operating. In the realm of
hard politics, in some cases the precedence of health that is theoretically
accorded by the texts of WTO agreements has been challenged by govern-
ments themselves. The Canadian government for many years used WTO
procedures, among other measures to defend asbestos exports against an EU
prohibition.109 And at the WTO, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Cuba,
Ukraine and Indonesia, with the support of large multinational tobacco
companies, have challenged Australia’s regime of plain packaging of tobacco
products, arguing that these measures violate the TRIPS Agreement and
breached articles of the Agreement on TBTs.110 This is an instance of a
pattern in which ‘internationally active firms do not just instigate their
home governmental authorities to file a WTO complaint on their behalf,
but sometimes also push foreign governments to file a WTO complaint
against policies of their own home government’.111
5 INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS)
The power asymmetry between corporate and public health constituencies is
especially marked with regard to ISDS provisions in TIAs, which allow foreign
investors (but not domestic firms or citizens) to challenge national laws and
policies. ISDS provisions both reflect and reinforce that power asymmetry. They
aim to reduce the risks for foreign investors by providing them with the right to
seek arbitration in situations where the actions of a host country government have
deprived them of profits, usually including future or anticipated profits.112 Although
originally established with the laudable intention of giving foreign investors pro-
tections that were not afforded by fragile host country legal systems, such provi-
sions now offer foreign investors access to a separate, parallel channel of dispute
resolution that is not accessible either to domestic entities or to citizens of the host
country. Such provisions have existed in international agreements since the late
1960s, although both the number of agreements incorporating them and the
number of cases initiated by investors has increased rapidly in recent years
(Figure 2).
109 Sentes, K. E., Oh, Canada-we Stand on Guard for Asbestos, 15 Can. For. Policy J. 30–49 (2009).
110 Eckhardt & De Bièvre, supra n. 105.
111 Ibid., at 508.
112 UNCTAD, supra n. 18, at 137–140.
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Figure 2 Known ISDS Cases, Annual and Cumulative, 1987–2015113
The ISDS process is based on a model of arbitration between two equal parties,
but the supposedly neutral process results in multiple advantages for the investor.
Only investors may bring proceedings, so states are always the defendants and not
able to initiate a claim or file a counterclaim as they could in domestic courts.
Because TNCs often have a legal presence in multiple countries through sub-
sidiaries or affiliates, they can initiate ISDS under whichever investment treaty
offers the most advantageous provisions (venue shopping). Other protagonists
have neither legal standing under the relevant TIAs nor the opportunity to
engage in this strategy.
Arbitration most often occurs through the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), established in 1966 as part of the
World Bank group, though several other institutions exist.114 ISDS provisions
normally require host States to participate in this arbitration process and comply
with the arbitration award. The award is binding, with no right to appeal, and
113 From World Investment Report 2016: Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges, by United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, © (New York and Geneva: United Nations 2016).
Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
wir2016_en.pdf.
114 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N. & Rostert, D., Investment Treaty Arbitration: Opportunities to Reform Arbitral
Rules and Processes (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development 2014), http://www.
iisd.org/pdf/2014/investment_treaty_arbitration.pdf.
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usually enforceable through domestic court systems,115,116 although a number of
practical difficulties may exist. Arbitrators often only have the authority to adjudicate
a dispute on the basis of the text of the agreement itself, without relying upon other
resources or witnesses, and cannot look to a state’s other international obligations
such as those associated with human rights treaties. In addition, arbitrators often have
a background in corporate law, and are drawn from a small and tightly close knit
community117 – effectively, an ‘arbitration industry’ – that is insulated from critiques
or legal challenges based on conflicts of interest.118,119 The lack of clear and accepted
definitions of key terms and concepts such as ‘indirect expropriation’ and ‘regulatory
taking’120 that are often invoked to expand the boundaries of investors’ claims for
damages both domestically and internationally allows investors (meaning in practice
mainly TNCs) abundant opportunities for policy challenges. Large TNCs are not
only most likely to be successful in disputes under ISDS provisions, but also have
been the main beneficiaries in financial terms.121 And not only proceedings but also
final decisions may be secret: for example, ‘ISDS tribunals rendered at least 43
decisions in 2014, 34 of which are public’.122
ISDS provisions have been used to challenge a variety of economic, social and
health policies. Such challenges have, for instance, addressed restrictions on
tobacco packaging; the implementation of a minimum wage; and the decision to
phase out nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster.123 In parallel with the
115 Eckhardt, J. & De Bièvre, D., Boomerangs over Lac Léman: Transnational Lobbying and Foreign Venue
Shopping in WTO Dispute Settlement, 14 World Trade Rev. 507–530 (2015).
116 Singh, S. & Sharma, S., Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The Quest for a Workable Roadmap,
29 Merkourios Utrecht J. Intl. Eur. L. 88–101 (2013).
117 Olivet, C. & Eberhart, P., Profiting from Crisis: How Corporations and Lawyers Are Scavenging Profits from
Europe’s Crisis Countries (Brussels and Amsterdam: Corporate Europe Observatory and Transnational
Institute 2014), http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/profiting-from-crisis_0.pdf.
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Transnational Institute 2012), http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfromin
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120 Rodrik, D., The Globalization Paradox 197–200 (New York: W.W. Norton 2011).
121 Van Harten, G. & Malysheuski, P., Who Has Benefited Financially from Investment Treaty Arbitration? An
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(Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
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industry-backed government challenges at the WTO, tobacco control measures are
also under challenge through ISDS. Under the terms of an Australia-Hong Kong
bilateral investment treaty a US tobacco and cigarette company, Philip Morris,
challenged Australia’s plain packaging requirement for tobacco products, arguing
through a Hong Kong subsidiary that it had lost anticipated profits due to this
measure. Although in this case unsuccessful,124 such challenges have a strong
potential dissuasive effect on governments around the world, and reinforce the
notion that trade and investment principles and rules have, and should have,
precedence over health rules. Similarly, under an investment agreement between
Uruguay and Switzerland, Philip Morris has used its Swiss subsidiary to challenge
Uruguay’s graphic health warnings for tobacco products.125 These examples illus-
trate the powerful commercial pressures that governments can face, exercised
through use of the TIA provisions, in their efforts to protect health.
The TTIP and the TPP, with the text of the latter now released and awaiting
ratification by signatory countries, each propose the incorporation of ISDS measures.
Given the proposed membership of these two agreements – forty countries are
involved in the negotiations – and their combined contributions to global GDP and
share of world trade, the proportion of world trade and investment covered by such
provisions would increase several-fold.126 Among other consequences, this would
increase the potential for regulatory chill, which is a special concern for LMIC
governments with limited resources. ISDS provisions could be used, for example, to
challenge minimum unit pricing for alcohol, taxes on unhealthy ultra-processed
foods, or nutrition labelling.127 Thus, ISDS provisions both reflect and entrench
power asymmetries with potentially destructive consequences for health. Among the
questions understandably raised by critics are: why should foreign investors not be
required to seek recourse through domestic court systems in countries where they
invest?128 And where is the justification for not comparably empowering citizens or
civil society organizations in situations where (for example) foreign investors fail to
live up to obligations as defined in international law? In contrast to many other
124 See Hurst, D., Australia Wins International Legal Battle with Philip Morris Over Plain Packaging, Guardian
(18 Dec. 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/dec/18/australia-wins-interna
tional-legal-battle-with-philip-morris-over-plain-packaging.
125 Sud, S., Brenner, J., & Shaffer, E., Trading Away Health: The Influence of Trade Policy on Youth Tobacco
Control, 166 J. Pediatrics 1303–1307 (2015).
126 Meléndez-Ortiz, supra n. 5.
127 Thow, A. M., Snowdon, W., Labonté, R., Gleeson, D., Stuckler, D., Hattersley, L. et al., Will the
Next Generation of Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements Undermine Prevention of Noncommunicable
Diseases? A Prospective Policy Analysis of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, 119 Health Policy 88–96
(2015).
128 Van Harten, G., Why Arbitrators not Judges? Comments on the European Commission’s Approach to Investor-
State Arbitration in TTIP and CETA (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School, York University 2014),
http://eu-secretdeals.info/upload/2014/07/Van-Harten_Comments-id2466688.pdf.
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elements of the global trend towards trade and investment liberalization, ISDS
provisions have drawn criticism from a range of actors including public health
physicians,129 a number of respected economists;130,131,132 UN special rapporteurs
and independent experts on human rights133; and even The Economist magazine.134
6 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Action is required on several fronts to redress the power asymmetries in the
processes of negotiating, implementing and adjudicating TIAs so as to better
protect the public’s health. Here we present a number of recommendations,
most of which require actions by national governments.
6.1 ENSURE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Transparency and accountability should be improved in all stages: negotiation, imple-
mentation and adjudication of TIAs. This requires open disclosure of negotiating texts
on an ongoing basis, and an immediate end to preferential corporate access to
negotiating processes. It requires that departments of government with responsibilities
for health protection be actively engaged in trade policy formulation, and that formal
mechanisms for prospective health impact assessment of TIAs, backed by adequate
resources, be put in place. It also requires opening up dispute resolution proceedings,
ensuring at the very least that they generate a fully accessible public record.
6.2 PROTECT POLICY SPACE
National governments should avoid making any commitments in TIAs that will
limit their ability (or the ability of lower levels of government within national
129 Weiss, M., Trading Health? UK Faculty of Public Health Policy Report on the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (London: UK Faculty of Public Health 2015), http://www.fph.org.uk/uploads/
FPH%20Policy%20report%20on%20the%20Transatlantic%20Trade%20and%20Investment%
20Report%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
130 Stiglitz, J., On the Wrong Side of Globalization, N.Y. Times (16 Mar. 2014), http://opinionator.blogs.
nytimes.com/2014/03/15/on-the-wrong-side-of-globalization/.
131 Rodrik, D., The Muddled Case for Trade Agreements. Social Europe [On-line] (2015), http://www.
socialeurope.eu/2015/06/the-muddled-case-for-trade-agreements/.
132 Johnson, L., Sachs, L., & Sachs, J., Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and US Domestic Law,
CCSI Policy Paper (New York: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 2015), http://ccsi.
columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-US-Domestic-
Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf.
133 OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), UN experts voice concern over
adverse impact of free trade and investment agreements on human rights. United Nations Human
Rights [On-line] (2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=16031&LangID=E.
134 Anon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Arbitration Game, Economist (11 Oct. 2014).
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borders) to set what they consider appropriate standards of health protection; and
should seek to renegotiate commitments now in place that have such effects.
Development assistance and professional and educational exchanges should assist
in building LMIC governments’ capacity to assess the implications of TIAs for
public health. Here priority should be given to multilateral approaches that are less
likely to reflect the biases too often present in bilateral assistance, and also to
South-South cooperation and exchange among developing countries.
6.3 PROTECT AND PROMOTE ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES AND HEALTH CARE
SERVICES
Progress toward universal health coverage has become a widely accepted objective
in advancing the right to health.135,136,137,138 Governments should avoid making
any commitments that may hinder the achievement of this aim; limit access to
essential medicines; or ‘lock in’ past decisions to involve private sector actors in
health care provision and finance. They should also seek to renegotiate commit-
ments now in place that have such effects, and support LMIC government efforts
to do so as a matter of development policy.
6.4 END THE USE OF ISDS PROVISIONS AND PURSUE A NEW APPROACH
TO INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
Because ISDS provisions tend to entrench andmagnify power asymmetries in ways that
can be destructive of health, governments should make no new commitments to ISDS
provisions built on existing models, and should seek to renegotiate those in place so as
to minimize their infringement on national sovereignty and policy space. Recent trends
in this direction include modifying investment agreements to incorporate exceptions
related to sustainable development, or protecting regulatory policy space,139 and
135 Reich, MR & Takemi, K., G8 and Strengthening of Health Systems: Follow-up to the Toyako Summit, 373
Lancet 508–515 (2009).
136 WHO, World Health Report 2010: Health Systems Financing – The Path to Universal Coverage (Geneva:
World Health Organization 2010).
137 UN, Global Health and Foreign Policy. Report No.: A/67/L.36 (New York: United Nations 2012).
138 UN, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – Outcome Document for the
UN Summit to Adopt the Post-2015 Agenda – Finalised Text for Adoption. Sustainable Development
Knowledge Platform (United Nations 2015), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/docu
ments/7888TRANSFORMING%20OUR%20WORLD_final.pdf (accessed 5 Sept. 2015).
139 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), Recent Trends in IIAS and
ISDS, Issues Note No. 1 (New York: UNCTAD 2015b), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf .
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termination of existing bilateral investment treaties by countries including South Africa
and Indonesia.140
6.5 PERMIT STATES’ TREATY OBLIGATIONS AS ARGUMENTS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In dispute resolution proceedings, governments should seek to defend measures that
would otherwise be considered impermissible restrictions on trade and investment
on the grounds that they reflect obligations under relevant treaties that the govern-
ment in question has ratified (such as the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the
right to health or to implement the Framework Convention on Tobacco). National
governments should seek to incorporate into TIAs provisions that protect this
defence; should make no commitments that would interfere with the ability to
mount such defences, and should seek to renegotiate existing commitments that
have this effect. Among other consequences, implementing this recommendation
will immediately enhance the position of health ministries and other agencies with a
health-related remit in the process of determining national positions on trade policy,
and provide a new and much-needed window of opportunity for civil society.
We end with a more positive and forward-looking recommendation, since
current negotiations and preoccupations tend to crowd out space for discussion of
viable alternatives.
6.6 THINK NEW
Governments, civil society and multilateral organizations should rethink the pur-
pose of trade and trade agreements, so that they foster wellbeing rather than serving
to promote and enforce investment interests. This can lead to new options for
international trade cooperation, including cooperation on rules designed to serve a
wider set of public policy/health goals, such as agreements on technology transfer,
research and development investment, and new approaches to financing medical
innovation.141,142 The adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals143 may
offer the opportunity for such initiatives.
140 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming
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en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf.
141 Hollis, A., The Health Impact Fund: A Useful Supplement to the Patent System?, 1 Pub. Health Ethics 124–
133 (2008).
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